Dr Emma Dore-Horgan asks you to imagine you are the judge presiding over the trial of Richard Smith, a man convicted (and with a history) of violent behaviour, and you must decide the terms of his sentence. It is the year 2051 and there exists a pill that can reduce aggression by increasing brain serotonin levels. Should Smith be offered this pill? Should Smith be required to take this pill as a condition of his parole?
These questions mark the beginning of a discussion on the ethics of ‘neurocorrection’: the practice of deploying interventions that exert direct effects on the brain to reduce offenders’ reoffending risk and/or facilitate their rehabilitation more generally. We currently use a form of neurocorrection – opioid-substitution therapy – to reduce drug cravings/drug-seeking behaviours in substance-abusing offenders. However, some speculate we will soon have further neurocorrectives at our disposal to, for example, reduce impulsive aggression or enhance empathy. When and under what precise circumstances might it be permissible to deploy these interventions?
