How do we decide what is corruption? How much should governments in developing states be limited in order to stop any possibility of corruption? How expansive and difficult is anti-corruption, and how much anti-corruption can poor countries afford to invest in?


This video offers a critique of views from public choice economics and new institutional economics, which suggests that rent-seeking is so costly that governments in developing economies should be restricted so that they cannot interfere with the markets in their countries. This has often given as an aim for structural adjustments or other neoliberal reforms.

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Sources:

Khan, M., 2010. Political settlements and the governance of growth-enhancing institutions.

Khan, M.H., 2013. Political settlements and the design of technology policy. In The Industrial Policy Revolution II (pp. 243-280). Palgrave Macmillan, London.

Ngo, C.N. and McCann, C.R., 2019. Rethinking rent seeking for technological change and development. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 29(2), pp.721-740.

Khan, M.H., 2004. Corruption, governance and economic development. The New Development Economics, pp.200-221.

Krueger, A.O., 1974. The political economy of the rent-seeking society. The American economic review, 64(3), pp.291-303.

Medema, S.G., 1991. Another look at the problem of rent seeking. Journal of Economic Issues, 25(4), pp.1049-1065.


Software used(All open Source):
• Blender
• Audacity
• Inkscape

Assets Used:
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• vecteezy.com
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Music(All under creative commons):
November by Kai Engel
September by Kai Engel

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