Turkey is gradually withdrawing from international cooperation and is resorting to a new juxtaposition of civilizations by synthesizing nationalism with nostalgic visions of history, memory, and religion. This transformation has been eventuating under the control of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his unofficial coalition partners, Islamists, nationalists and Eurasianists. While some underline that Turkey has become stronger, more independent and a regional game-changer increasingly addressing a global audience, others point out that the transformation of Turkey’s state identity under Erdogan’s rule has undoubtedly created a jarring effect, which could eventually hasten Turkey’s split from the West. The reconciliation of the instrumental use of Sunni Islam and nationalism with Erdogan’s right-wing populism and aggressive foreign policy strategies has triggered tensions with other countries. While others also accept that Turkey has been going through a coercive ethno-nationalist transformation of its state identity, they add that this dramatic transformation is not unprecedented in Ottoman-Turkish history, and it is likely that the cards may be re-shuffled sooner or later.
3:14: Senem Aydin Duzgit talks about Turkey’s state identity, Turkish public perceptions of identity, and the future of Turkey’s relations with Europe and the West.
12:17: Cengiz Candar evaluates the extent to which the concept of ‘Neo- Ottomanism’ can explain Turkey’s present-day foreign policy, as well as how Turkey’s diplomacy has been reshaped in relation to its new foreign policy objectives.
27:40: Nora Fischer-Onar notes the importance of challenging the assumption that Turkey’s domestic politics should primarily be defined by an opposition between Islamists and secularists. She specifies that those opposing views, though highly relevant, should be nuanced in order to reflect their diverse nature.
37:21: Karabekir Akkoyunlu explores two ways in which Erdogan chose to incarnate the state’s authority, ‘debureaucratisation’ and the concentration of power in his person, and the incorporation of the masses in politics.
Question 1: Are the abovementioned identity changes lasting ones, or do they belong to the Erdogan era?
Question 2: What is Erdogan’s ‘real’ power, is he in position to profoundly reshape the Turkish identity?
Question 3: Can a change be expected under the new Biden administration?
49:55: Senem Aydin Duzgit expresses reluctance about the lasting character of these changes. Erdogan’s power is ‘real’, but also fragile as it relies on coalitions. Biden’s administration could clash with Erdogan’s regime, provided the former will focus on “international democracy”.
53:30: Cengiz Candar supports the aforementioned idea that identity is a constructed concept, noting in parallel that the identity change that Erdogan has initiated could be a lasting one. He observes that Erdogan’s rule belongs to a post-Cold War area of populists’ rise. He posits, finally, that the Turkish-American relationship is “too loaded” with problems for the Biden administration to overcome them.
1:03:29: Nora Fischer-Onar explains that the idea of change should be nuanced in the sense that on the one hand Erdogan has created real changes in society, while on the other hand some aspects of “old Turkey” remain. The Biden administration’s approach to Turkey is expected to be based on the traditional transatlantic alliance.
1:07:55: Karabekir Akkoyunlu explains that Erdogan has concentrated considerable power, but is made fragile based on his lack of capacity to construct alliances. The Biden administration can be expected to be more hostile with the Erdogan regime.
