[2019] UKSC 44
UKSC 2018/0014
Gilham (Appellant) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent)
xOn appeal from the Court of Appeal Civil Division (England and Wales)
The appellant is a district judge, who was appointed in 2006. Over the following years she worked first at the Crewe County Court, and then the Warrington County Court, but in January 2013 she went on sick leave suffering from depression and anxiety. She has been on sick leave since that date.
In 2015 she brought a claim in the Employment Tribunal against the respondent, arguing that she had been subject to disability discrimination, and to detrimental treatment for making public interest disclosures (i.e. whistleblowing). These disclosures related to the supposedly poor working conditions and excessive workload which she and her fellow judges suffered. The Tribunal held, however, that the appellant could only bring a whistleblowing claim if she satisfied the definition of a ‘worker’ under s.230 ERA, and the Tribunal considered that she did not. The appellant was an office-holder, not a worker, and therefore could not bring a whistleblowing claim. The appellant appealed to both the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal but was unsuccessful on both occasions. She now appeals to the Supreme Court.
The issues are:
(i) Whether the appellant worked under a contract which falls within the meaning of the applicable statutory definition of ‘worker’ under s.230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (“ERA”), such that she is eligible to bring a whistleblowing claim against the Respondent;
(ii) Whether the appellant is eligible to bring her claim as a Crown employee under s.191 ERA;
(iii) Whether the domestic statutory definition of ‘worker’ and/or ‘Crown employment’ must be interpreted purposively in order to give effect to rights under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”), or Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 10.
The Supreme Court unanimously allows the appeal and remits the case to the Employment Tribunal on the basis that the appellant is entitled to claim the protection of Part IVA of the 1996 Act.
